What already appeared on 17 June 2026 to be a 60-day ceasefire built upon an all-too-vague Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is now revealing the real geopolitical question: how—and, above all, who—will control maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz? While the MoU signed by Iran and the United States stipulated that vessels would transit Hormuz toll-free during the 60-day truce, nothing would prevent Tehran from imposing transit fees once the ceasefire expires, making them a prerequisite for a lasting peace agreement.
It is precisely on this issue that the U.S. administration and the Iranian leadership remain fundamentally at odds, and it is the principal reason behind the renewed hostilities. Iran has resumed attacks against U.S. civilian and military assets in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Jordan, resulting in the deaths of three American service members, while also targeting Western oil tankers transiting the Strait without the regime’s authorization. In response, the United States has struck both strategic civilian infrastructure in Iran—such as bridges—and military targets, including an air traffic control tower, air defence and coastal surveillance sites, drone launch facilities, communications networks, and a regime-operated oil tanker.
Iran has also secured Houthi support in the Red Sea, leading to attacks on Saudi oil tankers and threats of further escalation should Washington intensify its military campaign. President Donald Trump responded by threatening massive retaliatory strikes, although such operations have yet to materialize.
The confrontation in Hormuz should be viewed within the broader negotiating strategy surrounding the most consequential issue of all: can the principle be established that maritime chokepoints may levy tolls on commercial shipping, in direct contradiction of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)? If so, what would prevent similar charges from eventually being imposed at the Cape of Good Hope or in the Strait of Malacca?
For the United States, freedom of navigation through strategic chokepoints remains a non-negotiable principle. For Iran, by contrast, control over the Strait could become the price demanded for ending the conflict, at least in the medium term. Alongside Tehran’s nuclear programme—which Washington continues to treat as non-negotiable—this is arguably the most important strategic contest now unfolding, with implications extending far beyond Hormuz to the very architecture of global maritime trade.
Returning to the military dimension of the conflict, President Donald Trump’s modus operandi has by now become relatively predictable: alternating between maximalist rhetoric of war and peace. Highly aggressive public statements are often followed either by a limited campaign of precision strikes before portraying the opposing side as eager for peace, or by a complete reversal accompanied by calls to resume negotiations.
Among anti-Trump circles, this approach has even acquired its own acronym: TACO—”Trump Always Chickens Out.” Financial markets frequently react accordingly: sharp sell-offs tend to follow Trump’s more belligerent statements, only to be reversed when he adopts a conciliatory tone, fuelling accusations from his political opponents of possible insider trading.
The past few days offer another example of this pattern. Trump first threatened Iran with devastating military action, then proposed imposing a 20% transit fee as a form of insurance guaranteeing safe passage through Hormuz, only to withdraw the proposal the following day. Instead, Washington limited its actions to blocking Iranian ports while continuing a pattern of limited military exchanges.
The primary casualty of this uncertainty has been the operational reliability of the Strait of Hormuz itself, one of the world’s most critical oil chokepoints. Around 80% of the crude oil passing through Hormuz is destined for Asian markets—including China, South Korea and Japan—but any disruption inevitably affects Europe and Italy as well, given the global and highly financialized nature of the oil market.
The geopolitical outlook remains highly fluid in the short to medium term and is likely to remain broadly unchanged until the U.S. midterm elections in November 2026, which may significantly influence President Trump’s willingness either to escalate or to de-escalate—and potentially “Syrianise”—the conflict with Iran.
Opinion polls indicate that roughly two out of three Americans oppose the war with Iran. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have passed a resolution—supported by several Republican lawmakers—calling for an end to the conflict. Although largely symbolic, the vote exposed significant political fractures within the conservative camp. The House also approved a second resolution by 214 votes to 208, while the Senate ultimately blocked it.
Current polling suggests Democrats are favoured to regain control of the House, while the Senate remains highly competitive. An electoral setback could encourage President Trump to accelerate negotiations.
At the grassroots level, an increasing number of figures once firmly aligned with Trump have become outspoken critics of his handling of the conflict, including former Fox News host Tucker Carlson and, among younger activists, influencer Nick Fuentes. While Trump has repeatedly defended both the political and moral legitimacy of military action against Iran, his continued pursuit of a negotiated settlement also suggests an eagerness to close this chapter quickly—perhaps to avoid exposing himself to criticism from the nationalist right.
Another possible interpretation is that, with this being his final term in office, Trump may be less concerned about the political consequences of his decisions. Should a diplomatic agreement prove unattainable, he may instead opt to preserve the current status quo, even at the cost of losing the midterm elections and complicating the Republican presidential campaign in 2028.
From a physical security perspective, the ongoing exchanges between Iran and the United States inevitably affect the safety and operational continuity of cargo vessels and oil tankers transiting Hormuz, with corresponding inflationary consequences.
Nevertheless, the actor whose actions are most likely to influence unrest on European streets remains Israel. Should Israel resume large-scale bombing campaigns in Lebanon—something that continues on a more limited scale even today, though without the sustained intensity or media attention associated with previous operations in Gaza—European cities could once again witness significant demonstrations during September, October and November organised by pro-Palestinian and broader anti-Israeli movements.
Such demonstrations are frequently infiltrated by organised violent groups, sometimes in considerable numbers, posing serious risks to public safety, businesses, private vehicles, public transport systems, and political and diplomatic personnel.
Particular attention should therefore be paid in the centres of major metropolitan areas such as Rome, Milan, Genoa, Naples and Bologna. Organisations should prepare contingency measures should tensions in the Middle East intensify further and closely monitor guidance issued by local Prefectures.
For the time being, however, this scenario remains relatively unlikely, given that Lebanon and Israel signed a U.S.-mediated framework agreement last month providing for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Isolated airstrikes remain a realistic possibility, but a campaign comparable in scale to Gaza appears significantly less likely.
From an energy security perspective, any escalation during the summer would coincide with seasonal peaks in electricity demand, increasing pressure on power prices and the cost of refined petroleum products at the pump.
Should the crisis deepen during the autumn months, the resulting oil shock would rapidly spill over into natural gas futures markets, potentially driving heating costs sharply higher, particularly in the event of an unusually severe winter.
